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Abstract
An extension to the classical notion of core is the notion of k-additive core, that
is, the set of k-additive games which dominate a given game, where a k-additive
game has its Mo¨bius transform (or Harsanyi dividends) vanishing for subsets of more
than k elements. Therefore, the 1-additive core coincides with the classical core.
The advantages of the k-additive core is that it is never empty once k ≥ 2, and that
it preserves the idea of coalitional rationality. However, it produces k-imputations,
that is, imputations on individuals and coalitions of at most k individuals, instead
of a classical imputation. Therefore one needs to derive a classical imputation from
a k-order imputation by a so-called sharing rule. The paper investigates what set
of imputations the k-additive core can produce from a given sharing rule.
Keywords: game theory, core, k-additive game, selectope
1 Introduction
A central problem in cooperative game theory is to define a rational way to share the total
worth of a game. Specifically, let N be the set of players, and v a game in characteristic
function form, assigning to each coalition S ⊆ N a worth v(S), which in the case of profit
game, represents the benefit arising from the cooperation among members of S. Suppose
that the best way to generate profit is to form the grand coalition N . An important
question is how to share the total benefit v(N) among the players. Any systematic way
of sharing v(N) is called a solution of the game.
The core [7, 19] is one of the most popular concepts of solution, and has been largely
studied (see, e.g., [4, 13, 15]). It is defined as the set of preimputations which are coali-
tionally rational, i.e., there is no coalition S such that the value v(S) that S can achieve
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by itself is strictly greater than the payoff x(S) given to S. This rationality condition
ensures that no coalition has interest to leave the grand coalition N .
The main drawback of the core is that it is often empty, so that other concepts of
solution have to be sought for. The literature abunds on this topic, and many new
solution concepts have been proposed, for example the kernel [2], the selectope [11, 3],
the nucleolus [17], the Shapley value [18] and so on.
Although all these propositions have their own merits, they depart from the funda-
mental idea of coalitional rationality of the core1. To keep as much as possible this idea,
Grabisch and Miranda have proposed the notion of k-additive core [10, 14]. Roughly
speaking, the condition of coalitional rationality x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N is preserved,
but the notion of imputation/payoff is enlarged: x(S) is no more the sum of payoffs
to individuals in S, i.e., x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi, but it is a sum of payoffs to individuals and
possibly to coalitions of size at most k in S. Such general imputations are called k-order
imputations. It is proved in [14] that as soon as k = 2, the k-additive core is never
empty. The drawback is that eventually each player should receive an individual payoff.
Therefore, once a k-order imputation has been selected, it remains in a second step to
compute from it a classical imputation.
The aim of this paper is precisely to study what kind of imputation one can find
through the k-additive core. We will show that this question is closely related to the
selectope, and that surprisingly, any preimputation can be attained through the 2-additive
core of a game. The paper is a continuation of [14], published in the present journal. In
addition to its interest for game theory, we believe it can bring a significant contribution
to the problem of cost or benefit sharing. On the mathematical point of view, it uses
mainly polyhedral techniques, and gives interesting insights on the structure of commonly
used set of solutions for games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic material on the
k-additive core and related notions. Section 3 gives some basic results about the convex
polytopes of the monotonic k-additive core and the convex part of the k-additive core.
Then, Sections 4 and 5 give the main results of the paper, i.e., the set of imputations
induced by some classes of sharing values on the k-additive core and the monotonic
k-additive core.
Throughout the paper, we will often omit braces for singletons and sets. Also we
will write sets in capital italic, collections of sets in capital calligraphic, and mappings
either in small italic or sans serif. For any vector x ∈ Rn and S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we use the
shorthand x(S) :=
∑
i∈S xi.
2 Notations and definitions
A game is a pair (N, v) where N := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, and v : 2N → R with
v(∅) = 0. If there is no fear of ambiguity, we will call a game simply v.
We denote by P(N) = 2N the set of all subsets of N , while the set of all subsets of N
1As remarked by one the referees, it is true that the nucleolus is nevertheless close to the idea of
coalitional rationality, through the notion of excess. However, we may say that the nucleolus aims at
minimizing the excesses, without paying attention if these excesses are positive (in which case coalitional
rationality is violated) or negative.
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of cardinality smaller or equal to k is denoted by Pk(N).
A game is monotone if S ⊆ T ⊆ N implies v(S) ≤ v(T ). It is additive if v(S ∪ T ) =
v(S) + v(T ) for every pair of disjoint coalitions S, T .
For any game v, its Mo¨bius transform [16] (or Harsanyi dividend [12]) is a set function
m : 2N → R defined by
m(S) :=
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |v(T ), ∀S ⊆ N.
If m is given, it is possible to recover v by v(S) =
∑
T⊆S m(T ). A game v is k-additive [8]
if its Mo¨bius transform vanishes for sets of more than k players: m(S) = 0 if |S| > k, and
there exists at least one S ⊆ N of k players such that m(S) 6= 0. Note that a 1-additive
game is an additive game.
We introduce various sets:
(i) The set of all games with player set N : G(N) = R2
n−1;
(ii) The set of all monotonic games with player set N : MG(N);
(iii) The set of all at most k-additive games Gk(N) = Rη(k), and at most k-additive
monotonic games MGk(N), with η(k) :=
∑k
ℓ=1
(
n
ℓ
)
. Note that G1(N) denotes the
set of additive games.
(iv) The set of selectors on N :
A(N) := {α : 2N \ {∅} → N, S 7→ α(S) ∈ S};
(v) The set of sharing functions on N :
Q(N) =
{
q : 2N\{∅}×N → [0, 1] | q(K, i) = 0 if i 6∈ K,
∑
i∈K
q(K, i) = 1, ∅ 6= K ⊆ N
}
.
If q is such that for all K there exists i ∈ K such that q(K, i) = 1, then q is a
selector. Conversely, any selector can be viewed as a sharing function. Moreover,
Q(N) is a convex polyhedron whose vertices are the selectors.
Next, we introduce various mappings defined on G(N) (or any subset like MG(N),
Gk(N), etc.). Most of the following notions are usually not considered as mappings, but
it is very convenient here to do so.
(i) The preimputation set PI : G(N)→ 2R
n
PI(v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N)};
(ii) The imputation set I : G(N)→ 2R
n
I(v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N};
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(iii) The core C : G(N)→ 2R
n
[19]
C(v) := {x ∈ Rn | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N, and x(N) = v(N)}
= {φ ∈ G1(N) | φ(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N, and φ(N) = v(N)};
(iv) The monotonic core MC : G(N)→ 2R
n
MC(v) := {φ ∈MG1(N) | φ(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N, and φ(N) = v(N)};
(v) The positive core C+ : G(N)→ 2
R
n
+ [5]
C+(v) := {x ∈ R
n
+ | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N, and x(N) = v(N)};
(vi) The k-additive core Ck : G(N)→ 2G
k(N) [14]
C
k(v) := {φ ∈ Gk(N) | φ(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N, and φ(N) = v(N)},
and similarly the k-additive monotonic core MCk and the k-additive positive core
Ck+;
(vii) The selector value xα : G(N)→ Rn for any selector α ∈ A(N) [3]
xαi (v) :=
∑
S|α(S)=i
mv(S), i ∈ N
where mv is the Mo¨bius transform of v;
(viii) The sharing value xq : G(N)→ Rn for any sharing function q ∈ Q(N) [3, 1]:
x
q
i (v) :=
∑
S∋i
q(S, i)mv(S), i ∈ N ;
(ix) The selectope S : G(N)→ 2R
n
[11]
S(v) := conv{xα(v) | α ∈ A(N)} = {xq(v) | q ∈ Q(N)}.
We may write [3]
S =
⋃
q∈Q(N)
xq.
(x) The marginal value pσ : G(N) → Rn, with σ ∈ S(N), the set of permutations on
N
pσσ(i)(v) := v(Si)− v(Si−1), i ∈ N,
where Si := {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}. Each marginal value is a selector value (and hence a
sharing value): the selector corresponding to pσ is α which selects in S the player
of maximal rank2 [3].
2We adopt the convention: i is the rank, and σ(i) the player of rank i.
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(xi) The Weber set W : G(N)→ 2R
n
[21]
W(v) = conv{pσ(v) | σ ∈ S(N)}.
From the above remark, we have W(v) ⊆ S(v) for any game v.
(xii) The Shapley value sh : G(N) → Rn [18]. Since sh(v) ∈ S(v), we write sh ∈ S
(particular sharing value).
We make several noteworthy remarks on the k-additive core.
• The k-additive core of v is the set of at most k-additive games dominating v.
Therefore, it contains the core of v when the latter is nonempty.
• An element φ of the k-additive core induces by its Mo¨bius transform mφ a preim-
putation on all coalitions of at most k players, since by definition mφ(S) = 0 for
all S ⊆ N such that |S| > k, and
∑
S∈Pk(N) m
φ(S) = v(N). We call such a (gener-
alized) imputation a k-order preimputation. Note that in general, mφ need not be
positive everywhere.
• The idea of coalitional rationality is kept in the following sense: given an element φ
of the k-additive core, for any coalition S, the sum of all k-imputations received by
S (that is, all quantities mφ(T ) for any subcoalition T of S of at most k members)
is equal or exceeds v(S). So the members of S, on the level of k-imputations, have
no incentive to leave the game.
It remains to derive from a given k-order preimputation mφ a classical preimputation
x, by sharing for every coalition S ∈ Pk(N) the amount mφ(S) among players in S, i.e.,
by using a sharing function q ∈ Q applied on mφ. In other words, any preimputation
obtained from mφ is a sharing value xq(φ) for some q ∈ Q, and vice-versa. It follows that
the set of preimputations derived from an element φ of the k-additive core is the selectope
S(φ). In short, the set of preimputations which can be derived from the k-additive core
is S(Ck(v)).
3 Basic results and facts on the k-additive core
The k-additive core is a polyhedron of dimension
∑k
i=1
(
n
i
)
− 1, possibly unbounded. A
study of its vertices has been done in [10], with results similar to the Shapley-Ichiishi
result for convex games. By contrast, the monotonic k-additive core is always bounded,
but has many more vertices than the k-additive core, and it seems quite difficult to study
them.
A noticeable fact shown in [14] is that Ck(v) 6= ∅ for any game in G(N), as soon as
k ≥ 2. However, this property does not hold for the monotonic k-additive core. Exact
conditions for nonemptiness are given in [14]; we call k-balanced-monotone a game v such
that MCk(v) 6= ∅.
We prove some elementary facts concerning the polytope MCk(v) and the convex part
of the k-additive core.
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Proposition 1. For every k-balanced-monotone game v on N , any 2 ≤ k ≤ n, any
sharing value xq we have:
ext(xq(MCk(v))) ⊆ xq(ext(MCk(v)))
xq(MCk(v)) = conv(xq(ext(MCk(v)))).
The result holds also if MCk is replaced by conv(ext(Ck)).
Proof. It is well known from the theory of polyhedra that if P is a polytope in Rm and ρ
is a linear mapping from Rm to Rp, m ≥ p, then ρ(P ) is a polytope. Moreover, a vertex y
of ρ(P ) is necessarily the image from a vertex of P (indeed, suppose that no x such that
ρ(x) = y is a vertex. Then it exists x1, x2 ∈ P , α ∈ ]0, 1[ such that x = αx1 + (1− α)x2.
By linearity, we get y = ρ(x) = αρ(x1) + (1− α)ρ(x2), contradicting the fact that y is a
vertex of ρ(P )), but the converse does not hold in general.
Since MCk(v) is a polytope and xq is linear, the first relation holds by the above fact.
Now, since conv(ext(P )) = P , we get
xq(MCk(v)) = conv(ext(xq(MCk(v)))) = conv(xq(ext(MCk(v)))),
the second equality coming from the inclusion relation.
By Proposition 1 and the fact that S =
⋃
q∈Q(N) x
q, we get:
Corollary 1. For every k-balanced-monotone game v on N and any 2 ≤ k ≤ n, we have:
S(MCk(v)) ⊆ conv(S(ext(MCk(v)))).
The result holds also if MCk is replaced by conv(ext(Ck)).
Equality holds if S(MCk(v)) is a convex set, which does not seem to be true in general.
Proposition 2. Suppose that C(v) 6= ∅. Then for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n and any sharing
value xq
xq(Ck(v)) ⊇ C(v).
The same result holds with the monotonic core.
Proof. Clear from the fact that Ck(v) ⊇ C(v), and that φ ∈ C(v) (considered as an
element of G1(N)) implies xq(φ) = φ.
Remark 1. (i) We have MC = C+. Indeed, an element of the positive core is monotone.
Conversely, take x in the monotonic core. It implies that for any S ⊂ N and i 6∈ S,
we have x(S∪i)−x(S) = x(i) ≥ 0. Obviously, this is no more true for the k-additive
core.
(ii) It is easy to find that v({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N is a sufficient condition for ensuring
C+ = C (and therefore MC = C). But a similar condition for the k-additive case
seems to be hard to find. Clearly, if v∗ dominates v, the monotonicity of v does not
imply the monotonicity of v∗ in general.
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4 Preimputations induced by the k-additive core
We begin by recalling the following result on systems of inequalities.
Lemma 1. Consider the system of n linear inequalities
n∑
j=1
aijxj ≤ bi, (i ∈ I)
n∑
j=1
a′ijxj = b
′
i, (i ∈ E),
where I, E are index sets forming a partition of {1, . . . , n}. Consider a given j0 ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that a′ij0 = 0 for all i ∈ E, and define I0 := {i ∈ I | aij0 = 0} (possibly
empty). If all aij0, i ∈ I \ I0, have the same sign, then the above system is equivalent to
n∑
j=1
aijxj ≤ bi, (i ∈ I0)
n∑
j=1
a′ijxj = b
′
i, (i ∈ E).
Proof. This result may be deduced from the Fourier-Motzkin elimination. Otherwise,
simply remark the following: suppose w.l.o.g. that aij0 > 0 for all i ∈ I \I0. Then, any in-
equality
∑n
j=1 aijxj ≤ bi, (i ∈ I \I0) will be satisfied for any x1, . . . , xj0−1, xj0+1, . . . , xn,
for a sufficiently negatively large value of xj0.
This observation is the key for the next theorem.
Theorem 1. For any xq, q ∈ Q(N) such that q(K, i) > 0 for all K ⊆ N and i ∈ K, for
any v ∈ G(N), for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n, we have
xq(Ck(v)) = PI(v).
Therefore, S ◦ Ck = PI.
Proof. Take any v ∈ G(N), and any k ≥ 2. Since Ck(v) 6= ∅, for any v∗ ∈ Ck(v) with
Mo¨bius transform m∗, we have:
m∗(i) ≥ v(i), i ∈ N∑
K⊆S
|K|≤k
m∗(K) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N, |S| > 1
∑
K⊆N
|K|≤k
m∗(K) = v(N).
Take any xq with sharing system q ∈ Q(N) and write for simplicity x := xq(v∗). We have
by definition
xi = m
∗(i) +
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m∗(K).
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Then
m∗(i) = xi −
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m∗(K).
Replacing in the above system, we get:
xi −
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m∗(K) ≥ v(i), i ∈ N
∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
i∈S
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m∗(K) +
∑
K⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N, |S| > 1
∑
i∈N
xi −
∑
i∈N
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m∗(K) +
∑
K⊆N
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K) = v(N).
The second line becomes
∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
K⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K)
∑
i∈K
q(K, i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−
∑
K∩S 6=∅
K 6⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K)
∑
i∈K∩S
q(K, i) +
∑
K⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K) ≥ v(S)
or ∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
K∩S 6=∅
K 6⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K)
∑
i∈K∩S
q(K, i) ≥ v(S).
Therefore the system becomes:
xi −
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m∗(K) ≥ v(i), i ∈ N
∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
K∩S 6=∅
K 6⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K)
∑
i∈K∩S
q(K, i) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N, |S| > 1
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N).
Now, by positivity of q, applying Lemma 1 successively to all m∗(K), it remains only
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N).
Remark 2. xq = sh fulfills the condition, hence sh(Ck(v)) = PI(v). It can be interpreted
by saying that any preimputation can be seen as the Shapley value of some element (in
general not unique) of the 2-additive core.
We turn now to the case of selector values.
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Theorem 2. Let α ∈ A(N) be a selector and xα the corresponding selector value. Then,
for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n we have
xα(Ck(v)) = {x ∈ PI(v) | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N, S 6∈ C(α)}
where C(α) := {S ⊂ N | ∃K ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |K| ≤ n,K ∩ S 6= ∅, K 6⊆ S, α(K) ∈ S}.
Proof. From proof of Theorem 1, we know that, for any v∗ ∈ Ck(v) with Mo¨bius transform
m∗, the system of inequalities is:
xi −
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m∗(K) ≥ v(i), i ∈ N
∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
K∩S 6=∅
K 6⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K)
∑
i∈K∩S
q(K, i) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N, |S| > 1
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N),
with q corresponding to xα, that is, q(K, i) = 1 if and only if α(K) = i, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, the system becomes:
xi −
∑
K|α(K)=i
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K) ≥ v(i), i ∈ N s.t. α(K) = i for some K, 2 ≤ |K| ≤ k
xi ≥ v(i), i ∈ N otherwise∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
K∩S 6=∅
K 6⊆S
α(K)∈S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N, |S| > 1 s.t. S ∈ C(α)
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N, |S| > 1 s.t. S 6∈ C(α)
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N).
Applying Lemma 1 successively to all m∗(K), we get the result.
Therefore, xα(Ck(v)) is a superset of C(v), whose structure depends on which coalitions
appear in the inequalities. We can be more specific by taking marginal values, which are
particular selector values.
Theorem 3. For any permutation σ ∈ S, for any v ∈ G(N), for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n, we have
pσ(Ck(v)) =
{
x ∈ PI(v) |
i∑
j=1
xσ(j) ≥ v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}), i = 1, . . . , n− 1
}
. (1)
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Proof. This time q corresponds to pσ, that is:
q(K, i) = 1 if and only if ℓσ(K) = i
and q(K, i) = 0 otherwise, where ℓσ(K) is the last element of K in the order σ. Therefore,
proceeding as for Theorem 2, we get:
xσ(1) ≥ v({σ(1)})
xi −
∑
K|ℓσ(K)=i
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K) ≥ v(i), i = 2, . . . , n
xσ(1) + · · ·+ xσ(i) ≥ v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}), i = 2, . . . , n− 1∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
K∩S 6=∅
K 6⊆S
ℓσ(K)∈S
2≤|K|≤k
m∗(K) ≥ v(S), S ⊂ N, S 6= {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)} for some i ∈ N
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N).
(note that in the 4th inequality, the set of K such that K ∩S 6= ∅, K 6⊆ S, ℓσ(K) ∈ S, 2 ≤
|K| ≤ k is never empty due to the assumption that S is not one of the sets in the chain
induced by σ) Applying Lemma 1 successively to all m∗(K), we get the result.
Let us study the structure of pσ(Ck(v)). We denote by Cσ the maximal chain associ-
ated to σ, that is, Cσ = {S1, . . . , Sn}, with Si := {σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}. We introduce v|Cσ the
restriction of v to the maximal chain Cσ (game with restricted cooperation). Therefore,
we have
pσ(Ck(v)) = C(v|Cσ).
The core of games with restricted cooperation has been largely studied (see a survey
in [9]). We can derive directly from known results the structure of pσ(Ck(v)). A first
observation is that this set is nonempty, for it contains the marginal value pσ(v), obviously
solution of the set of inequalities (1). Moreover, pσ(v) is the unique vertex of pσ(Ck(v)).
Indeed, there are n− 1 inequalities and one equality in (1), hence from it we can derive
only one set of n equalities, which precisely defines pσ(v).
It remains to find the extremal rays of pσ(Ck(v)), which can be obtained by known
results about the core of games with restricted cooperation. The collection Cσ being a
chain, it is a distributive lattice of height n, whose join-irreducible elements are {σ(1)},
{σ(1), σ(2)},. . . ,{σ(1), . . . , σ(n)}. We cite the following result due to Tomizawa.
Proposition 3. (Tomizawa [20], also cited in Fujishige [6, Th. 3.26]) Let F ⊆ 2N be a
distributive lattice of height n, with joint irreducible elements J1, . . . , Jn. The extremal
rays of C(0), the recession cone of C(v), are of the form (1j,−1i), with i ∈ N such that
the smallest join-irreducible element J containing i satisfies |J | > 1, and j ∈ J , such that
the smallest join-irreducible element J ′ containing j is the predecessor of J in the poset
of joint-irreducible elements.
Applying this result to our case, we find the following.
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Proposition 4. For any permutation σ ∈ S, for any v ∈ G(N), for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n,
pσ(Ck(v)) is a pointed unbounded polyhedron, with unique vertex pσ(v), and extreme
rays given by 1σ(i−1) − 1σ(i), i = 2, . . . , n.
As a consequence of Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and Proposition 2, we have immediately
Theorem 4. For any 2 ≤ k ≤ n, for any v ∈ G(N), we have
⋂
σ∈S
pσ(Ck(v)) =
⋂
α∈A(N)
xα(Ck(v)) =
⋂
x∈S
x(Ck(v)) = C(v).
5 Preimputations induced by the monotonic k-additive
core
The case of the monotonic core is much more tricky to study, because monotonicity
induces supplementary inequalities which make Lemma 1 inapplicable. Nevertheless, a
result can be derived for the case of selector values.
A first simple but important observation is the following.
Lemma 2. If P1, P2 are two polyhedra in R
m, and ρ is a linear mapping from Rm to Rp,
then ρ(P1 ∩ P2) = ρ(P1) ∩ ρ(P2).
Proof. Let P1, P2 be defined by sets of k and ℓ linear inequalities respectively, in vari-
ables x1, . . . , xm. Then P1 ∩ P2 is defined by the union of these two sets of inequalities.
Now, ρ(P1), ρ(P2) are polyhedra defined by sets of k and ℓ linear inequalities in variables
y1, . . . , yp, and the union of these two systems defines ρ(P1) ∩ ρ(P2). But this system is
also the transform by ρ of the system defining P1 ∩ P2, hence it represents ρ(P1 ∩ P2) as
well.
We apply this result with P1 = C
k(v) and P2 the polyhedron of monotone k-additive
games. Clearly MCk(v) = P1∩P2, and it suffices to study the transform of P2 by sharing
values. Polyhedron P2 reads, in the space of the Mo¨bius transform (see [1]):
P2 =
{
m ∈ Rη(k) |
∑
K∋i,K⊆S
1≤|K|≤k
m(K) ≥ 0, S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, i ∈ S
}
,
with η(k) :=
∑k
ℓ=1
(
n
ℓ
)
.
Theorem 5. Let α ∈ A(N) be a selector satisfying the following property: if K,K ′
are such that 2 ≤ |K|, |K ′| ≤ k and q(K, i) = q(K ′, i) = 1 for some i ∈ N , then any
K ′′ ⊆ K ∪K ′ such that 2 ≤ |K ′′| ≤ k satisfies q(K ′′, i) = 1. Let xα be the corresponding
selector value. Then, for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n, for any k-balanced-monotone game v we have
xα(MCk(v)) = {x ∈ PI(v) ∩ Rn+ | x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊂ N, S 6∈ C(α)}
where C(α) := {S ⊂ N | ∃K ⊆ N, 2 ≤ |K| ≤ n,K ∩ S 6= ∅, K 6⊆ S, α(K) ∈ S}.
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Proof. From Lemma 2, it suffices to compute pσ(P2). For ease, we express x
q(P2) for any
sharing value q ∈ Q(N). For any game v in P2 with Mo¨bius transform m we have
m(i) ≥ 0, i ∈ N∑
K∋i,K⊆S
1≤|K|≤k
m(K) ≥ 0, S ⊆ N, |S| > 1, i ∈ S.
Writing for simplicity x := xq(v), we have by definition
xi = m(i) +
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m(K),
so that
m(i) = xi −
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m(K),
for all i ∈ N . Replacing in the above system, we get:
xi −
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m(K) ≥ 0, i ∈ N (2)
xi +
∑
K∋i
K⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
(1− q(K, i))m(K)−
∑
K∋i
K 6⊆S
2≤|K|≤k
q(K, i)m(K) ≥ 0, S ⊆ N, |S| > 1, i ∈ S. (3)
Let us consider the selector value xα for some α ∈ A(N). Then q(K, i) = 1 or 0, for every
K ⊆ N , 2 ≤ |K| ≤ k, and every i ∈ N . Consider i to be fixed, and denote by K the
collection of sets K, 2 ≤ |K| ≤ k, such that q(K, i) = 1. If K is empty, then (2) reduces
to
xi ≥ 0.
Suppose then that K is not the empty collection, and consider S =
⋃
K, i.e., the union
of all sets in K. Observe that |S| > 1 and S ∋ i. Equation (3) for this S gives:
xi ≥ 0,
since by hypothesis any K ⊆ S such that K ∋ i and 2 ≤ |K| ≤ k is a member of K,
and any K 6⊆ S satisfies q(K, i) = 0 by definition of K. Hence in any case, we get the
inequality xi ≥ 0. This reasoning can be done for any i ∈ N , therefore x1, . . . , xn ≥ 0.
The remaining inequalities have the form
xi +
∑
K∋i
2≤|K|≤k
ǫm(K) ≥ 0,
with ǫ = 0, 1 or −1. Let us eliminate all variables m(K) by Fourier-Motzkin elimina-
tion from this system of inequalities. Observe that elimination amounts to add pairs
of inequalities, possibly multiplied by some positive constants. Therefore, as a result of
elimination, it will remain only inequalities of the form
a1x1 + . . .+ anxn ≥ 0,
with a1, . . . , an ≥ 0, so that they are all redundant with x1, . . . , xn ≥ 0.
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Observe that any marginal value pσ is a sharing value having the property requested
in Theorem 5. Therefore, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. For any permutation σ ∈ S, for any v ∈ G(N), for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n, for any
k-balanced-monotone game v, we have
pσ(MCk(v)) =
{
x ∈ PI(v)∩Rn+ |
i∑
j=1
xσ(j) ≥ v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}), i = 1, . . . , n−1,
}
. (4)
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